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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a novel continuous
authentication system for smartphone users. The proposed
system entirely relies on unlabeled phone movement
patterns collected through smartphone accelerometer.
The data was collected in a completely unconstrained
environment over five to twelve days. The contexts of phone
usage were identified using k-means clustering. Multiple
profiles, one for each context, were created for every
user. Five machine learning algorithms were employed for
classification of genuine and impostors. The performance
of the system was evaluated over a diverse population of
57 users. The mean equal error rates achieved by Logistic
Regression, Neural Network, kNN, SVM, and Random
Forest were 13.7%, 13.5%, 12.1%, 10.7%, and 5.6%
respectively. A series of statistical tests were conducted to
compare the performance of the classifiers. The suitability
of the proposed system for different types of users was also
investigated using the failure to enroll policy. 1
1. Introduction
The PIN, password, and pattern based authentication
systems have several drawbacks as they need to be
remembered; are not user-friendly anymore–as the overall
authentication process is time consuming; offer only
entry-point security; and are susceptible to video-based side
channel, shoulder surfing, and social engineering attacks
[1, 2]. The fingerprint, face, and iris based recognition
systems do address the first two drawbacks, however,
they are also susceptible to spoof, and social engineering
(intoxication) attacks, as well as, not very suitable for
continuous verification [3]. The above-mentioned pitfalls
of the existing and extensively used authentication systems
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are some of the key reasons behind the rapidly evolution
of behavioral-biometrics continuous authentication systems
since the last few years.
Behavioral footprints such as typing, swiping, walking,
arm movements while walking, hand kinematic synergies
and their neural representations, and possible combination
of these have demonstrated the potential, and promise in
user authentication [4–11]. However, several challenges
still exist and have not been addressed. For example,
the availability of these modalities throughout the user
interaction with the smartphone; collection of labeled
data for enrollment and verification process under
different operating conditions (phone-usage contexts), and
practicality of these systems under realistic scenarios.
Moreover, the context of phone usage varies from user
to user significantly. For example, a smartphone user
can swipe, type, talk while sitting, standing, walking, in
an elevator, in a moving bus, train, or in a car. For
each of these contexts, the biometric footprints may vary
significantly. So building authentication systems without
taking the context into consideration would result in poor
authentication decisions. Additionally, the availability of
these footprints may vary across different applications. In
practice, the existing individual modality based systems
could have limited application, such as to secure activities
on a targeted application. Almost every study has assumed
the phone-usage context, and/or the availability of labeled
samples to guide the authentication process, and have
maintained constrained data collection environments [6, 8,
9, 12].
In reality, the process of labeling contexts is quite
intrusive and unlikely to be implemented by industry and/or
accepted by common smartphone users. Hence, both of
the assumptions i.e. context is known, and availability of
labeled samples are unrealistic. Some smartphone users
may have specific usage contexts occurring with very high
frequency during typical phone usage, while the other may
never operate their smartphones in some of the contexts
at all. Therefore, assuming a universal set of contexts,
common across the user population may not be very helpful.
Instead, developing models that could identify user-specific
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
04
39
9v
1 
 [c
s.H
C]
  1
5 A
ug
 20
17
phone-usage contexts, and designing authentication models
for each context could be a plausible solution.
This paper attempts to address the above-mentioned
challenges by collecting phone movement patterns that
are seamlessly available while the phone is in use or
just in user’s possession under a completely unconstrained
environment (i.e. makes no attempt to label the data or
assumes any context); applies semi-supervised learning
algorithm to identify phone-usage contexts, and utilizes the
predicted contexts to guide the authentication process. The
main contribution of this paper is summarized below:
• Builds a dataset of continuous phone movement
patterns collected from a diverse population of 57 users
over a period of 5 to 12 days under a completely
unconstrained environment.
• Presents a novel authentication method based only
on phone movement patterns. The method identifies
the phone-usage context automatically by using
K-means clustering and Random Forest classifier. The
enrollment and verification process was implemented
by employing five distinct machine learning classifiers,
namely, Logistic Regression, Neural Network, kNN,
SVM, and Random Forest.
• The performance of the authentication system was
evaluated and reported in terms of Equal Error Rates
(EERs). The performance of classification algorithms
was compared using a series of statistical tests.
• The suitability of the proposed system for different
types of users was also investigated using Failure to
Enroll policy. This investigation provided interesting
insights into the usability of the proposed system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
2 presents related work; Section 3 describes the data
collection, preprocessing, and feature analysis; Section
4 discusses design, implementation, training and testing
processes of the proposed authentication system; Section
5 presents the experimental results and discussion; and
Section 6 concludes our work.
2. Related Work
Several behavioral footprints including swiping [5],
typing [4], walking [6], arm movements [7], and their
possible fusion [8, 9] have been studied in the past for
authenticating individuals continuously [13]. The phone
movement pattern was studied by Kumar et al. [8], Sitova
et al. [9] and, Buriro et al. [14] recently. Sitova et. [9]
focused mainly on phone movement patterns while walking
and sitting, whereas, Kumar et al. mainly studied phone
movement patterns while typing or swiping. In a different
study, Tang et al. [12] studied the phone movement patterns
under two different conditions, dynamic (walk, upstairs,
and downstairs), and static (sit, stand, and lie). Murmuria
et al. [15] studied power consumption, touch gestures,
physical movement, and their combination for continuous
authentication of smartphone users.
One of the common problems that the above studies
have that their experiments have been carried out under
a controlled or restricted environment. Another major
problem that they have is the availability of the mentioned
footprints thought the user activity on the device. Our
work addresses these concerns by (1) keeping the data
collection environment completely unconstrained, and (2)
capturing the phone movement patterns throughout the user
interaction with the device.
In a similar attempt, Mahbub et al. [16] collected data
from multiple sensors including front camera, touch sensor,
and location service under an unconstrained environment
for continuous authentication of smartphones users. In
another study, Mehbub et al. [17] proposed methods to
authenticate users based on their trace histories. They
also present a challenging dataset that contains multiple
sensor signals collected from 48 volunteers on Nexus
5 phones over a period of 2 months. The sensors
include a front-facing camera, touchscreen, gyroscope,
accelerometer, magnetometer, light sensor, GPS, Bluetooth,
Wi-Fi, proximity sensor, temperature sensor and a pressure
sensor. It would be interesting to apply our methods on the
dataset presented by Mahbub et al. [16] and explore the
viability of all the modalities that have been captured for
continuous authentication of smartphone users.
3. Data Collection and Preprocessing
3.1. Data Collection
Following approval of the University’s Institutional
Review Board, we invited the faculty, staff, and students
to participate in our study. The majority of the
participants were university students, while the rest
were university staff or faculty. All of them were
regular smartphone users. The participating individuals
were from different colleges, departments, and programs,
including Engineering, Mathematics, Biomedical and from
different countries including India, China, Nepal, Guyana,
Uganda, USA, Iran, and Russia, resulting in a diverse
sample. The participants were briefed about the level of
engagement, type of data collection, battery consumption,
our expectation, and the amount of compensation.
An Android application (App) was developed to capture
phone movements patterns continuously as long as the
phone was switched on. On its first startup, the App
automatically activated a service in the background that
was responsible to capture the acceleration of the phone
seamlessly. The App was installed on the participant’s
phone instead providing them an experimental phone to
ensure completely realistic and unconstrained operating
environment.
However, there was at least one disadvantage of
doing so was the varying sampling rate across the user
population. The configuration for sampling rate was set to
sensor delay normal to avoid excessive power consumption
by the participant’s device. The rule of sampling rate was
not obeyed by all of the devices as they were running
different versions of the operating systems (Android 4.0 or
higher). The forty of the total 57 users had sampling rate
between 4 to 10, six users had between 10 to 20, whereas,
remaining 11 users had more than 20 samples per second.
The mean of sampling rate was 18.28 whereas the median
was 6.63. To deal with the varying sampling rates, we used a
fixed length of windows in terms of time instead of number
of samples during feature extraction.
The participants were asked to come in at least five days
or later, give the data, and collect their compensation of
$30. Several individuals registered to participate in our data
collection study, about half of them never returned. We
selected only those users who had at least five and up to
twelve days of data for this study. The total number of users
who followed the 5−12 days criteria turned out to be 57 out
of 88 who returned. The data was collected for several days
to ensure that a full cycle of activities that the user undertake
is captured.
3.2. Exploratory Data Analysis
For almost every user, a major segment of the data
belonged to the unattended (but switched on) state of the
phone. The unattended state of the phone in this context
means the accelerometer records almost no acceleration.
The direct removal of the segment of data that had lower
acceleration than a threshold was distorting the signal. So,
we used a window based scheme to identify and remove the
segments belonging to the unattended state of the phone.
For each user, the data was divided into segments of 2.5
seconds. For each segment, the medians of x, y, and z values
were computed and compared with predefined thresholds.
The segment was discarded using the following criteria: if
(lx < mx < ux) && (ly < my < uy) && (lz < mz < uz)
then discarded else kept, where mx, my , and mz were
the medians of x, y, and z values, and lx, ux, ly , uy , lz ,
and uz , were lower and upper thresholds for series x, y, z
respectively. The thresholds were computed by using the
upper and lower envelope of the accelerometer readings that
were collected by keeping the phone unattended for hours.
The values of the thresholds were -0.036, 0.035, −0.02,
0.06, −0.22, and −0.13 respectively.
The data belonging to unattended phone state was
discarded for two reasons. First, the phone movement
pattern while the phone was unattended, was overlapping
too much across the user population, so it could have
injected only noise into the authentication system. Second,
we believed that there is no need to authenticate the user
when the phone is in the unattended state. The median
filtering with a span of three data points was applied before
extracting features.
4. Experimental Setup
4.1. Characteristics of Phone Movement Pattern
We hypothesized that the phone movement patterns
recorded under different operational contexts could be
used to build continuous authentication systems. The
hypothesis was based on the fact that the phone movements
are readily available, and easily collectible throughout
the user interaction with the device, exerted by almost
every user, could be distinctive if observed under specific
contexts, do not change frequently, neither requires any
user attention or intervention, and hardly imitable [18].
The initial design goals of the system aimed to be
able to: run in the background; identify the context of
the phone usage automatically; select the corresponding
authentication model; and verify individual’s authenticity at
frequent intervals.
The phone movement patterns were not distinctive
enough among the users as we expected in the first
observation. However, when divided into several contexts
through clustering, they turned out to be quite distinctive
measurements among the users [8, 9]. So one of
the biggest challenges that we faced was to automate
the identification of contexts from the unlabeled phone
movement patterns. We considered several possibilities:
(1) developing semi-supervised models to divide the phone
movement patterns into well-known human activities, (2)
develop samples for human activities and apply sparse
coding to identify the contexts (3) clustering the unlabeled
behavioral footprints and use the cluster indices to train a
Context Identification Model (CIM ). However, we realized
that it was not required to map the contexts to well-known
human activities for developing the authentication systems,
so we decided to implement (3).
The next challenge was to define features that could help
clustering algorithm in dividing the data not only based on
the distance-based similarity but also on the structural-based
similarity. This was one of the reasons to apply clustering
of data at the feature-level not at the data-level. To capture
the structural similarity of the signal as well as the pair of
signals, we extracted a variety of features including spectral
entropy, histograms (bins), Dynamic Time Warping (DTW)
distance between the pair of signals ( acceleration in X ,
y, and Z directions). The maximum number of clusters
was fixed to eight in our experiment for each user. The
distribution of data among the clusters varied drastically
for every user (see Figure 1). Some clusters had nominal
samples, hence were neglected in the experiment. This
behavior was expected as some users might have operated
their phone in very different circumstances than the other
ones. It would be interesting to find out the optimal number
of clusters (contexts) that offers the best authentication
Table 1. The list of features extracted from phone movement patterns recorded by accelerometer sensors built into smartphones.
Spectral entropy Histogram (16 bins) Standard deviation Interquartile Range (Q3 −Q1) Mean
Bandpower Dynamic Time Warping distance between pair of signals Range (max-min) Peak magnitude to RMS Ratio Energy
Median frequency Mutual information between pair of signals Screen on/off Correlation between pair of signals
accuracy.
A flowchart of the system is presented in Figure
2. The design of the authentication system could be
divided into two phases: enrollment and continuous
verification. The enrollment phase in our system, included
three steps: user-specific clustering of training data;
training user-specific Context Identification Model (CIM )
using the clusters and their indices; and finally training
context-specific authentication models for each user. While
the continuous verification phase included identification of
the context of the test samples using the CIM ; selecting
the appropriate authentication model using the context
id produced by CIM ; and then comparing the scores
(assigned by the authentication model to the test samples)
with a predefined threshold to make the authentication
decision.
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Figure 1. Illustrating the distribution of data across different
clusters (contexts) for individual users. The same colors in bars
do not mean the same type of context among the users. These
contexts need not be mapped to any known human-activity to guide
the authentication process. We simply numbered them so that we
can identify and develop a separate authentication model for each
of them.
4.2. Feature Extraction
The clustering, context classification, and user
authentication were carried out at the feature level.
The features were extracted from the signals formed by
the accelerometer readings in the x, y, z, directions and
their resultant m which was defined as,
√
(x2 + y2 + z2).
The features set consisted of descriptive statistical features
such as mean, standard deviation, interquartile range, as
well as features from frequency, spectral, and information
theory domain e.g. band power, median frequency, spectral
entropy, and mutual information, correlation, and Dynamic
Time Warping distance between the pair of signals (see
Table 1).
In order to implement the continuous authentication
paradigm, we extracted these features by using sliding
window protocol with ten seconds of window size and five
seconds of overlapping [6, 19]. These numbers were derived
from the existing body of the work in this domain. The
screen on/off information was also used as a feature during
both, the context classification and authentication process.
The values of this feature were basically the percentage of
times the screen was switched on in the windows of data
used for feature extraction.
4.3. Feature Analysis
To reduce the number of features, we evaluated all the
extracted features by using the correlation based feature
subset selection method with breadth first search method.
The feature selection was performed separately for each
context, for each user. The best of features that could
distinguish between the genuine and the impostor classes for
a particular context of a user, were selected and used to build
the authentication model for that context of that user. On an
average 70% are more features were discarded through the
correlation based feature selection method.
The scale of extracted features varied drastically,
hence we normalized all the features between zero to
one. To decide upon the normalization method, we
tested all the features for normality using one-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [20]. The null hypothesis of each
test was that the feature values follow a standard normal
distribution. The test resulted in one if it rejected the
null hypothesis at the significance level of 5%, or zero
otherwise. The test results concluded that most of the
features were not normally distributed, hence, we applied
min max normalization [21].
4.4. Genuine and Impostor Sample Considerations
The authentication models were implemented by using
multi-class classifiers, hence, were trained by using samples
from both genuine and impostors classes. For both, training
and testing phases, the genuine samples were created using
the data belonging to the actual (candidate) user, whereas
the impostor samples were created using the data belonging
to the rest of the users.
4.5. Context Identification Model (CIM)
The context identification model (CIM ) was built
separately for each user assuming that the users might have
a different number of and distinct phone usage contexts. The
number of context for each user indeed varied as shown in
Figure 1. To build the CIM , we clustered the normalized
feature vectors using the k-means clustering algorithm.
Assuming each cluster represented a distinct phone usage
context, the cluster indices were assumed as class labels.
To train CIM , we used feature vectors along with their
Phone 
Mvt 
Patterns
Preproc.
& Feature 
Extraction
Preproc.
& Feature 
Extraction
K-means 
Clustering
Train 
Authentication 
Models
Authentication 
Models
Context 
Identificat
ion Model 
(CIM)
Train Context 
Identification 
Model
Score 
> Th
Imposter Genuine
Training 
Data
Feature 
Vectors 
CIM
Feature 
Vectors
+
ClusterID 
A1, A2, A3,..., An
Clusters
C1, …, Cn
Feature 
Vectors 
Testing 
Data
No Yes
Clusters
C1, …, Cn
Figure 2. A flowchart illustrating the design of the system. The
unlabeled phone movement patterns were equally divided into two
parts training and testing. During training, the feature vectors went
through the k-mean clustering that produced clusters. Assuming
each cluster represented a context, context-specific authentication
models were trained using five different classifiers. Similarly,
CIM was trained using Random Forest. During verification,
the testing part of data was supplied to the preprocessor and the
feature extractor to obtain feature vectors. The feature vectors
were supplied to the Context Identification Model (CIM ) which
produced the context (or cluster) ID. The cluster ID was used to
select the appropriate authentication model. The feature vectors
were supplied to the selected authentication model to obtain the
authentication decision.
corresponding cluster ID as class labels. The CIM was
implemented using the Random Forest classifier. Random
Forest was chosen because it was proven to be effective in
existing studies [7, 12, 19].
4.6. Identifying Phone Usage Contexts
As shown in the Figure 2, testing samples were passed
through CIM of the corresponding user to find out the
context of the test sample. Using the predicted context,
the corresponding authentication model was selected that
provided the authentication decision. For example, let the
supplied test sample was classified into context C2, then
A2 was used to make an authentication decision, if A2
was build using the feature vectors belonging to cluster C2
during enrollment.
4.7. Context-wise Authentication Models
Multiple authentication models, one for each context,
were trained for each user. These classifiers needed
knowledge of both genuine, and impostor classes. In
our experimental setup, a fixed number of samples were
borrowed from rest of the users and used as impostor
samples. The ideal thing would be to choose any of the
samples from other users as impostor samples than the
candidate user. However, we used only those samples from
other users as impostor samples that were classified (by
CIM ) in the similar context as of the candidate user.
The mapping of contexts among the users was
challenging as the context Ci of the Ucandidate may not
necessarily match with the contexts Ci(s) of Uimpostors.
Therefore, it would not be ideal to use the samples from
Ci of user Uimpostors as impostor samples for training
the authentication model Ai for the context Ci of the
Ucandidate. To address this problem, we simply used the
CIM of Ucandidate that classified samples of Uimpostors
into one of the contexts of Ucandidate. For example, to build
the authentication model A2 for context C2 of user U1, the
samples belonging to C2 of user U1 were used as genuine
samples. While samples of other users U2 - U57 were first
classified using the CIM of U1, then, a portion of those
samples that were classified as C2 was used as impostor
samples for training A2.
4.8. Verification and Performance Evaluation
Five different classifiers, namely, Logistic Regression,
Neural Network, k nearest neighbor (kNN), support vector
machine (SVM), and Random Forest were used for
implementing the authentication models. One of the
reasons to employ these classifiers was their effectiveness
in the existing studies [6–9, 12, 19, 22, 23]. Also, their
suitability for solving both linear and nonlinear recognition
problems as well as have distinct operational characteristics.
The setting for Logistic Regression classifiers was the
generalized model with binomial family. The number of
neurons in the hidden layer of Neural Network (Multilayer
Perceptron) was set to 10. The k-NN was implemented
using the k=10. The SVM was used with RBF Kernel
and C-classification settings. Rest of the settings for all
classifiers were left to default as provided by respective
packages of R language.
All authentication models were tested for both genuine
and impostor pass rates. The prediction probabilities for
unknown samples that came from Ugenuine were referred
to as the genuine score. While the prediction probabilities
for unknown samples that came from Uimpostors were
referred to as the impostor scores. The performance of
every authentication model was evaluated using the equal
error rate (EER). The error rate obtained for a threshold at
which false accept and false reject rates match is known
as the EER. The EER was computed using the genuine
scores, impostor score, and varying thresholds. The EER
has been extensively used to compare the authentication
systems. The lower the EER is the better the authentication
system.
5. Experimental Results and Discussion
5.1. Performance Across User Population
The results of all experiments are summarized in Figure
3. All sub figures except the one in the bottom-right
corner represent the user-wise performance of Logistic
Regression, Neural Network, kNN, SVM, and Random
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(a) Logistic Regression
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(b) Neural Network
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(c) k Nearest Neighbors
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(d) Support Vector Machine
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(e) Random Forest
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Figure 3. Figures 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), and 3(e) show the equal error rates achieved by Logistic Regression, Neural Network, k Nearest
Neighbors, Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest respectively. While Figure 3(f) shows means and standard deviations of
equal error rates achieved by the classifiers over all possible contexts of all the users. It is quite evident that the Random Forest wins the
race in terms of the accuracy.
Forest respectively. The box plot for each user was plotted
using the mean EERs for each context. The box plots depict
the median EER (center red line) for each user. Red cross
whiskers represent the EERs of the outliers contexts. Figure
3(f) illustrates the average and standard deviation of EERs
computed across all the contexts of all 57 users. The average
equal error rate were 13.7%, 13.5%, 12.1%, 10.7%, and
5.6% with the standard deviation of 7%, 7%, 4.2%, 4.3%,
2.7% for Logistic Regression, Neural Network, kNN, SVM,
and Random Forest classifiers respectively. The median
EERs achieved by Random Forest, SVM, and kNN were
very consistent across the user population. While the Neural
Network has performed very well for most of the users
but quite poorly for few users. A similar trend could be
observed for the Logistic Regression classifiers.
5.2. Comparison of the Classifier’s Performance
The average and standard deviations of EERs could be
misleading while ranking the quality of these classifiers for
authentication purpose. Figure 3(f) gives an impression that
the Neural Network-based authentication systems exhibited
significantly inferior performance compared to kNN, and
Table 2. Results of statistical test for significance of difference
in the mean EERs obtained by the different machine learning
classifiers.
Pair of
Algorithms
p-values
Normality Performance
KS Friedman Wilcoxon
Random Forest - SVM 4.63E-13 1.43E-11 8.74E-11
Random Forest - Neural Network 3.57E-13 3.22E-13 5.43E-11
Random Forest - Logistic Regression 1.80E-12 2.22E-12 2.24E-10
Random Forest - kNN 1.21E-12 2.22E-12 1.02E-10
SVM-Neural Network 4.16E-12 1.18E-02 0.0025
SVM-Logistic Regression 2.32E-12 3.49E-04 6.52E-06
SVM-kNN 5.67E-12 3.49E-04 2.17E-04
kNN-Neural Network 1.92E-11 0.6911 0.6421
kNN-Logistic Regression 7.43E-12 0.0469 0.0088
Neural Network-Logistic Regression 1.54E-10 0.8946 0.5328
SVM based systems. However, that may not be the case
if we remove a few users that exhibited outlying error rates.
Hence, to measure the quality of these classifiers, a series of
statistical tests was conducted.
The mixed effects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
is generally used to test the statistical significance of
differences between mean error rates of the two different
methods. Mixed effects ANOVA works under the
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(b) After removing 5% bad users
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(c) After removing 10% bad users
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(d) After removing 15% bad users
Figure 4. The y-axis represents the cumulative distribution mean EERs obtained by all five classifiers. Figures 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d)
show the cumulative distribution of mean EERs after the removal of 0, 3, 6, and 9 bad users systematically.
assumption that the underlying distribution of the pairwise
difference of error rates follows a Gaussian distribution
[24]. Therefore, first, we tested the pairwise difference of
mean EERs for the normality using Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(KS) test [20]. The null hypothesis was that the pairwise
difference of mean EERs obtained by two algorithms
follows a Gaussian distribution. KS test rejected the null
hypothesis at the 5% significance level for all pair of
algorithms. Since for all pair of algorithms, the pair-wise
difference between mean error rates failed to pass the
normality test, we chose to use Friedman test [24].
The Friedman test was carried out under the null
hypothesis that the algorithms are equally accurate. Table 2
shows that the test resulted in significantly low p-value (less
than 10−2), for all pairs of the classifiers except for (kNN,
NNet), (kNN, LogReg), and (NNet, LogReg). Therefore
we failed to reject the null hypothesis for kNN, NNet, and
LogReg at the significance level of 3%. We also performed
the Wilcoxon signed rank test. The test results affirmed
the same conclusion as of Friedman (see Table 2). As the
statistical tests demonstrated that the mean EERs obtained
by kNN, NNet, and LogReg are sufficiently similar, we
conclude that differences among the performances of kNN,
NNet, and LogReg are statistically insignificant.
5.3. User-wise Suitability of the Proposed Systems
The behavioral footprints of individuals are subjected to
change under different operating conditions. Our proposed
model addresses that concern up to a certain extent by
clustering the patterns. The same behavioral trait, if
significantly different under different conditions, could get
clustered under two or more contexts depending on what
operating conditions that behavioral activity occurred. In
Figure 3, we could see that few users have significantly high
error rates (e.g. user ids 9, 36, 43, and 55). We referred to
the users who have high error rates as bad users. The high
error rates could be because of the following reasons: (1)
the bad users have high variance in their own data, and/or
(2) their phone movement pattern overlap too much with
the other users.
Through Figure 4, we could see the impact of the
systematic removal of bad users on the overall performance
of the proposed systems. The removal of top 3 (5% of total)
bad users caused the Random Forest consistently maintain
the mean EERs below 10% for each user. SVM, kNN,
and Neural Network could achieve below 10% mean EERs
for half of the users, while the rest of the users fell under
10-20%. However, Logistic Regression still had more than
20% of the total users who had beyond 20% EERs, and
more than 40% users had EERs between 10-20%. Likewise,
removal of top 9 (15% of total) bad users brought SVM,
kNN, and Neural Network in the same league in terms of
mean EERs. Needless to say that the Random Forest was
the most suitable algorithm, whereas, Logistic Regression
was the least.
6. Conclusion and Future Work
We conclude that it is possible to continuously
authenticate smartphone users using only phone movement
patterns. Our experimental results hold Random Forest
as the most suitable classifier for implementing such
authentication system. The Random Forest outperformed
SVM, kNN, Neural Network, and Logistic Regression.
User-wise suitability of the proposed system was also
investigated. The results suggested that the proposed system
may not be suitable for certain types users and could
exhibited quite high error rates. The exclusion of those
users, however, could improve the overall performance
significantly. Therefore, we conclude that the phone
movement pattern based authentication systems may not be
suitable for every smartphone user. In the future, we plan to
explore: the suitability of one class classifiers for the above
system as decision on selecting the impostor samples for
training was difficult; explore the fusion of phone movement
patterns with other biometric modalities in order to improve
the authentication accuracy; and the investigate the fusion
of decision of authentication models based on different
classification algorithms.
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